We present a structural random search model with firm, worker and match heterogeneity. We estimate the model on the Swedish employer-employee matched data and measure the return to education and gender at different firms.

We develop an equilibrium search model with all the characteristics of the SSP program. Using SSP and LFS data we estimate the model and evaluate general consequences of generalizing the policy to the entire region.

Proving the folk theorem in a game with three or more players usually requires imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the stage-game payoffs. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) assume full dimensionality of payoffs, while Abreu et al. (1994) assume the weaker NEU condition (“nonequivalent utilities”). In this note, we consider a class of n-player games where each player receives the same stage-game payoff, either zero or one. The stagegame payoffs therefore constitute a one-dimensional set, violating NEU. We show that if all players have different discount factors, then for discount factors sufficiently close to one, any strictly individually rational payoff profile can be obtained as the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium with public correlation.